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Inventa Componere: Rhetorical Process and Poetic Composition in Pindar's Ninth Olympian Ode*

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According to the rhetorical precepts of classical antiquity, the process by which formal discourse is produced to meet the needs of a particular occasion comprises several theoretically distinguishable (although in practical terms inextricably interconnected) phases. In Cicero's succinct formulation, "The orator must consider three things: what to say, in what order, and in what manner" (*tria videnda sunt oratori: quid dicat et quo quidque loco et quo modo*, *Orat.* 43).[1] In the first phase of the compositional process (εὕρεσις, *inventio*) the speaker or writer must determine what he needs and wishes to say (*quid dicat*), and this he does by familiarizing himself with the full range of facts and circumstances involved in the case, identifying any items of external evidence that may be useful to his purposes, and then "discovering" or "inventing" as many additional proofs as are required to establish his chosen line of argument. In the second phase (τάξις, διάθεσις, *dispositio*), the speaker or writer takes up the problem of organization (*quo quidque loco*): having assembled and/or generated the various materials out of which his discourse will be constructed, he must arrange them in a clear and coherent sequence that permits each individual element to show off to best advantage–or, as Cicero expresses it elsewhere, he must "manage and marshall his discoveries, not merely in orderly fashion, but with a discriminating eye for the exact weight as

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[1]Translations of Cicero's *Orator* and *de Oratore* are from the Loeb editions of, respectively, H. M. Hubbell (1962) and E. W. Sutton (1942). Pindar is cited from B. Snell and H. Maehler, *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* I (Leipzig 1987); scholia from A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina* I (Leipzig 1903). Full references to works cited by author's last name are given in the bibliography at the end.

it were of each argument" (*inventa non solum ordine sed etiam momento quodam atque iudicio dispensare atque componere, de Orat.* 142). In the third phase (λέξις, *elocutio*), finally, the speaker or writer turns his attention to manner (*quo modo*), seeking to give apt and effective verbal expression to the materials which he has thus organized, "arraying them in the adornments of style" (*vestire atque ornare oratione, de Orat.* 142).

Though the various authorities who outline this sequence of compositional phases do so with speech-writing (particularly *forensic* speech-writing) in mind, and though the rhetorical theories which codified the sequence were not explicitly formulated until well after Pindar's lifetime, I believe that, suitably modified, these phases can nevertheless provide a useful model for the analysis of the Pindaric epinician. This is hardly surprising since the victory-ode is, as a genre, both *encomiastic* and *occasional*. On the one hand, praise-poetry is inherently "rhetorical" (i.e., directed toward persuasion) for the simple reason that praise, in order to attain its proper end and effectively *be* praise, must gain the assent of its audience.[2] On the other hand, the epinician poet resembles the professional speech-writer or advocate in being hired to represent his client's "case" on a specific occasion which, defined as it is by a particular set of facts and circumstances, both gives his powers of "invention" their starting-point and inspiration and limits the range within which they can be exercised. To demonstrate the utility of this compositional model for the analysis of the Pindaric epinician generally, I shall apply it here to a single ode of considerable length and complexity, the ninth *Olympian*. My intention in doing so, I must emphasize, is not to attempt the impossible task of reconstructing Pindar's actual thought-processes in the act of composition, but merely to engage in a heuristic exercise aimed at gaining a clearer understanding of the only thing that is in fact available to us, the text itself. In Section I, under the rubric of *inventio*, I start where Pindar himself presumably started, namely with the factual data presented to the poet by the commission itself, and then proceed to identify and examine the amplificatory materials, both gnomic and mythic, which he "invents" through meditation on those given facts. In Section II, under the rubric of *dispositio*, I investigate the principles and techniques by which he arranges his assemblage of materials, both "given" and "invented," in a logically coherent and plausibly motivated sequence.[3]

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[2]For a vigorous statement of the essentially rhetorical nature of the epinician see W. J. Slater, "Doubts About Pindaric Interpretation," *CJ* 72 (1977) 193-208.

[3]*Elocutio* as a distinct phase in the compositional process will not be dealt with here, though I shall occasionally remark on individual points of style.

I. INVENTIO

In accepting a victorious athlete's commission, the epinician poet undertakes, among other things, to persuade potentially skeptical audiences, present and future, of the validity of the proposition "X is praiseworthy." In the construction of this encomiastic argument, the three main types of material out of which the typical epinician is composed–factual data pertaining to the victor and his family, stories drawn from the treasure-house of Hellenic myth and legend, and general reflections on the conditions and issues of human life–serve as "proofs" or "grounds of belief" (πίστεις, *probationes*). The ancient authorities agree in drawing a primary distinction between *inartificial* or *atechnic* proofs on the one hand and *artificial* or *entechnic* proofs on the other. Atechnic proofs are those "which have not been furnished by ourselves but were already in existence" (ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ προϋπῆρχεν), "which are not thought out by the orator... but are supplied to him by the case itself or by the parties" (*quae non excogitantur ab oratore...sed ad oratorem a causa atque a reis deferuntur*), "which are adopted by the orator from outside the art of speaking" (*quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet orator*). Entechnic proofs, on the other hand, are those "which can be constructed by system and by our own methods" (ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ δι' ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν), "which are founded entirely on the orator's reasoned argument" (*quae tota in disputatione et in argumentatione oratoris collocata est*), "which he himself deduces or, if I may use the term, begets out of his case" (*quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodam modo gigneret*).[4]

Although the types of atechnic proof which authorities like Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian cite (witnesses, tortures, oaths, laws, previous court-decisions, and the like) make it obvious that it is above all forensic rhetoric that they have in mind when they draw this fundamental distinction, the distinction is in fact no less applicable to the rhetorical task and situation of the epinician poet. When an ode is viewed as a piece of encomiastic argumentation, the nucleus of factual information that in and of itself reflects credit on the athlete, whether directly (e.g., the list of his own victories) or indirectly (e.g., the victories of his family or clan), serves as atechnic proof of his praiseworthiness

[4]Arist. *Rhet.* 1.2.2, Cic. *de Orat.* 2.116, Quint. 5.1.1. The translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and of Quintilian are from the Loeb editions of, respectively, J. H. Freese (1926) and H. E. Butler (1920). On the distinction between atechnic and entechnic proof, see Lausberg 191-94.

in the sense that, being "already in existence," it is available for immediate use at the time that the poet sets to work and can, as it were, be read into the record directly.[5]

Unlike the *personalia*, however, the myths and general reflections (*gnomai*) that are likely to make up the bulk of the ode are not supplied to the poet ready-made but instead must be specially worked up or "invented" for the occasion through meditation on the given facts. They belong, indeed, to that class of entechnic proofs which Aristotle calls πίστεις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, i.e., proofs which "depend upon the speech itself, in so far as it demonstrates or seems to demonstrate" (*Rhet.* 1.2.3), and which he subdivides into *examples* (the rhetorical equivalent of induction in dialectic) and *enthymemes* (the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism). In so far as the "myths" of epinician poetry narrate "things that have happened before" (πράγματα προγεγενημένα) and thereby implicitly or explicitly establish relationships of significant similarity (or contrariety) between past and present circumstances, they can be said to function rhetorically as *paradeigmata* of the "historical" type.[6] As for *gnomai*, defined by Aristotle as general statements "concerning the objects of human actions, and what should be chosen or avoided with reference to them" (περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν), they are simply "the premises or conclusions of enthymemes without the syllogism" (*Rhet.* 2.21.2).[7] Thus in the end each of the three main types of encomiastic proof in the epinician derives its persuasive effect from a different logical operation: conjectural inference from tokens in the case of the factual data, analogic induction in the case of myths, and syllogistic deduction in the case of maxims.

For the epinician poet no less than for the writer of forensic or deliberative speeches, the starting-point in the process of composition is a firm grasp

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[5]Aristotle himself extends his use of the term "atechnic" from the forensic to the encomiastic sphere at *Rhet.* 3.16.1, where he remarks, *à propos* of narrative in epideictic speeches, that "a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the author of the actions which he relates), and of another that does depend upon art" (τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον...τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης).

[6]It is clear from the way Aristotle defines and illustrates his two categories of παραδείγματα (*Rhet.* 2.20) that he regards mythical *exempla* as "historical" rather than "invented"; cf. e.g., D. C. Young, *Pindar Isthmian 7, Myth and Exempla*, Mnemosyne Supplement 15 (Leiden 1971) 45 n. 144.

[7]Although the two other types of entechnic proof distinguished by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 1.2.3-6, the "ethical" (πίστις ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος) and the "emotional" (πίστις ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως), also have important roles to play in the epinician, their mode of operation is too complex to be considered here.

of what Aristotle calls τὰ ὑπάρχοντα 'the existent elements' of the case at hand.[8] In the epinician context these existent elements typically consist of certain *facts of identity* on the one hand (the victor's name, his father's name, his clan, his city) and certain *facts of achievement* on the other (venues and events in which the laudandus, often along with other members of his family or clan, has been victorious). What the facts are in any particular case we can know, more often than not, only from the finished ode itself.[9] It is a noteworthy though by no means unparalleled feature of *O.* 9 that it names neither the victor's father nor his clan, and since it is reasonable to assume that such omissions could take place only with the consent, if not indeed at the instruction, of the client himself, we must conclude that Epharmostos did not regard either name as essential to his self-definition.[10] As a result, the only "facts of identity" included in the ode are those pertaining to *ethnos* and *polis*: Epharmostos is a Lokrian, and a citizen of Opous. Of the "facts of achievement" only one pertains to a person other than the laudandus himself, namely the Isthmian victory in wrestling of a certain Lampromachos, the exact nature of whose connection with Epharmostos remains unclear (see below, p. 144 with n. 68). Epharmostos' own record of success as a wrestler, however, is impressive indeed: in winning the current Olympian victory he has completed the *periodos* of Panhellenic contests,[11] and in addition he has accumulated numerous wins in a wide range of local festivals in Boeotia (the Theban Iolaia), Attica (Athens, Marathon, Eleusis), and the Peloponnese (Argos, the Arcadian Lykaia, Pellene). Among individual athletes celebrated in Pindar's odes, only the renowned

[8]Cf., e.g., *Rhet.* 2.22.11, on which see below, pp. 139-140.

[9]In the case of *O.* 9 Epharmostos' name appears on the list of Olympian victors found at Oxyrhynchus (P.Oxy 222), but without any additional information that is not supplied by the ode itself; see L. Moretti, *Olympionikai, i vincitori negli antichi agoni olimpici* (Rome 1957) 92-93.

[10]Odes in addition to *O.* 9 in which the victor's father is not identified by name include *O.* 1, *O.* 4, *P.* 3, *P.* 4, *P.* 5, *P.* 7, *P.* 12, *N.* 6, *I.* 3, and *I.* 7. In a number of these the victor is either a ruler (*O.* 1, *P.* 3, *P.* 4, *P.* 5) or otherwise politically and socially prominent (*P.* 7); in two cases (*O.* 4, *I.* 3) the father's name appears in a second ode for the same victor. On *N.* 6 see C. Carey, "Prosopographica Pindarica," *CQ* 39 (1989) 8 with n. 36. In *O.* 8 one of the two men named but not otherwise identified in lines 81-82 (Iphion, Kallimachos) is probably Alkimedon's father; see Carey's discussion on p. 6 of the article just cited. A patronymic form denoting the victor's γένος or πάτρα appears in approximately one third of Pindar's odes (*O.* 3, *O.* 6, *O.* 7, *O.* 8, *O.* 13, *P.* 6, *P.* 7, *P.* 8, *N.* 2, *N.* 4, *N.* 6, *N.* 7, *N.* 8, *I.* 4, *I.* 6).

[11]On the relative chronology of Epharmostos' Olympian and Pythian victories, see Simpson 116 n. 16.

boxer Diagoras of Rhodes, a *periodonikês* like Epharmostos, can lay claim to a more extensive catalogue of triumphs.[12]

Such, to the extent that we can know them, are the facts handed to Pindar with his commission to compose an ode for Epharmostos. In so far as "composing an ode" means "constructing an encomiastic argument," the poet must begin by marshalling "grounds of belief" on the basis of which his audience may be persuaded of the validity of the proposition "Epharmostos is praiseworthy." One such "ground of belief" lies immediately to hand in Epharmostos' impressive roster of victories, which in and of itself, without any need for elaboration, eloquently attests to the kind of man and athlete that he is; its presentation in the first and final triads of the ode will be discussed when we come to consider *dispositio*. It is, however, the only atechnic *pistis* that the occasion provides, since evidently neither Epharmostos' immediate family nor the clan at large can lay claim to any agonistic exploits that would shed additional luster on his own achievements. For other proofs of praiseworthiness, therefore, Pindar must resort to *inventio*, "excogitating" or "begetting" them out of the given facts of identity and achievement.

The purely quantitative aspect of Epharmostos' achievement, for example, gives rise to entechnic proof of the enthymematic type in the form of gnomic reflections on the superiority of natural ability to skills acquired through instruction: since no mere workmanlike diligence in his sport could have sustained such a series of successes, Epharmostos must possess innate–or, to put it another way, god-given–talent of a highly unusual order. Once again, the placement of these reflections immediately following the victory-catalogue (lines 100ff) is a point that will be touched on later. As regards their content, the contrast between φυά and διδαχή is of course a Pindaric commonplace, in both its "subjective" and its "objective" applications, and so too is the conceptual equivalence of the "natural" with the "god-given" that is evident in the restatement of τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν (line 100) as ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ, σεσιγαμένον / οὐ σκαιότερον χρῆμ' ἕκαστον (lines 103f).[13] As usually (though not always) happens, the syllogistic application of the *gnomai* to the case at hand, and hence their relevance to the ode's underlying encomiastic argumentation, is left to be worked out by the audience on its own along the

[12]*O.* 7.80-87, comprising eleven venue-entries. The most extensive of all the victory-catalogues in Pindar's odes is that of the Oligaithidai in *O.* 13.98-113 (fifteen venue-entries).

[13]On both the φυά/διδαχή antithesis and the equivalence (in such contexts) of φυά and θεός (or μοῖρα), see A. M. Miller, "*N.* 4. 33-43 and the Defense of Digressive Leisure," *CJ* 78 (1982-83) 209-211, with references there cited, and Hubbard 107-24.

lines indicated by a scholiast's paraphrase: "any man who attends the games with divine aid, like Epharmostos, is worthy to be sung and talked of."[14]

Even more fertile in the generation of entechnic proofs than the sheer scale of Epharmostos' agonistic record, it would seem, is one particular item in that record: his victory as a youth at Marathon. Although Pindar's metaphorical language leaves the exact circumstances of this victory unclear, it would seem that Epharmostos underwent some kind of last-minute reclassification which compelled him to compete against opponents who outranked him in age (πρεσβύτεροι), and that despite the odds he "endured the contest" and emerged from his several bouts "without a fall," thereby evoking the noisy admiration of the spectators.[15] Pindar's normal handling of victory-catalogues points to several clues which indicate that he finds a particular significance in the incident.

One of these clues is the position of the entry within the catalogue. Although local venues differ from the four Panhellenic festivals in having no fixed order in which they are listed in victory-catalogues, certain items exhibit a marked tendency to gravitate toward certain positions.[16] The evidence—admittedly scanty—offered by other catalogues suggests that the listing of Marathon immediately after Argos and Athens involves a promotion well out of its normal ranking in the hierarchy of prestige.[17] When we also observe that

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[14]Σ 156c οἷον μετὰ θεοῦ τις παραγενόμενος εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας ὡς ὁ Ἐφάρμοστος, οὗτος καὶ ὑμνεῖσθαι καὶ λαλεῖσθαι ἄξιός ἐστιν. Another scholium adopts a "subjective" interpretation of line 100 (εἰς ἑαυτὸν δὲ αἰνίττεται· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν λέγει αὐτοδίδακτον 152d), and this approach is taken to the passage as a whole by, e.g., Bundy 16-17 and 30, Simpson 121-23, and Pavese 109. See further below, n. 65. That the lines in fact refer first and foremost to Epharmostos' agonistic achievements is explicitly recognized by, e.g., Schmid 251, Benedictus 181, C. G. Heyne, *Pindari carmina* I (Göttigen 1798) 129, Boeckh 195, Gildersleeve 210, Bernardini 150-51.

[15]Apparent connotations of violence in the phrase συλαθεὶς ἀγενείων have given rise to the suggestion that the presiding officials were misled by Epharmostos' mature appearance and as a consequence unjustly stripped him of the right to compete against his "beardless" age-mates (so, e.g., Wilamowitz 350, Farnell 73, Méautis 415, Fernández-Galiano 266). Pausanias refers to an incident in which Nikasylos of Rhodes, eighteen years of age, was debarred (ἀπηλάθη) by the Eleans from competing in the boys' wrestling but won in the men's match and was proclaimed victor (6.14.2).

[16]Cf. Bernardini 188 n. 74. Athens and Argos, for example, tend to stand at or near the beginning of local catalogues (e.g., *O.* 7.82f, *O.* 9.88, *O.* 13.107, Bacch. 10.32) while Eleusis, Euboia, and Aigina tend to appear at or near the end (*O.* 7.86, *O.* 9.98f, *O.* 13.110ff, *P.* 8.79f, *I.* 1.57, Bacch. 10.34ff).

[17]In the lengthy catalogue of Oligaithid victories at *O.* 13.98ff., Marathon appears as ninth out of eleven local contests (line 110), well behind the Arcadian Lykaia (third) and Pellene

in sheer length the Marathon entry takes up more than one third of the entire catalogue,[18] and that of all the entries it includes by far the most descriptive detail,[19] we are led to conclude that in his meditation on the facts of Epharmostos's record, Pindar must have come to see in the youthful victory at Marathon a significance that transcended, and was quite independent of, the ordinary status of that contest.

The nature of this significance is to be seen in the poet's "invention" of *paradeigmata*. Ancient rhetorical tradition recognizes two categories of exempla, those that are materially connected with the case at hand (οἰκεῖα παραδείγματα) and those that are extraneous or 'alien' (ἀλλότρια παραδείγματα); of these the former are generally regarded as having greater force and efficacy under ordinary circumstances.[20] Thus if on the one hand Epharmostos' Lokrian ethnicity and Opountian citizenship immediately suggest a general line of argument (namely that he is the worthy product of a venerable tradition of excellence extending back to the time of the Flood), they also offer some specific "native" or "domestic" exemplars in whom that tradition is embodied and with whom Epharmostos can be implicitly compared. One is Opous, the city's eponymous hero, whose status as a son of Zeus adopted into the Lokrian royal line by Lokros himself makes him an apt paradigm of inborn or god-given excellence; moreover, as "a man remarkable beyond telling for his beauty of form and his deeds" (ὑπέρφατον ἄνδρα μορφᾷ τε καὶ ἔργοισι 65f.), he can serve as an exemplar and prototype of the perfect correspondence between appearance and performance that was exhibited by the youthful Epharmostos in his victory at Marathon (ὡραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλὸς κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις 94).[21]

(fourth) and just after Eleusis, while in the brief second installment of Aristomenes' victory-catalogue at *P.* 8.76ff., Marathon is put after Megara (as it is also in *O.* 13).

[18]68 out of 198 syllables, counting from the middle of line 84 (where Epharmostos enters the picture in ἀμφότεροι). As is pointed out by Race 7 n.13, it is the syllable, not the word or line, that is the appropriate unit of measure in determining relative emphasis.

[19]More descriptive detail, indeed, than is to be found anywhere else in Pindar's victory-catalogues, and of a type that Pindar, unlike Bacchylides, normally eschews, as is noted by Bernardini 149.

[20]Cf. Apsines 8 (L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* I [Leipzig 1853] 280): πᾶν παράδειγμα ἔχει μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἐκ τῶν γεγονότων, λαμβάνεται δὲ ἢ ἐξ οἰκείων ἢ ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων. τὰ μὲν ἐξ οἰκείων *ἀγωνιστικώτερα καὶ προσεχέστερα*.... τὰ δ' ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίων προσώπων λαμβανόμενα...*οὐχ ὁμοίως προσεχῆ*. The ethical and rhetorical advantages of *oikeia paradeigmata* are at issue in, e.g., *N.* 3.26ff., *N.* 7.50ff., Isoc. *Phil.* 113, *Evag.* 77, ad *Dem.* 9, and Dem. *Olynth.* 3.23.

[21]On the Opous/Epharmostos parallel see, e.g., Dissen 117, Mezger 470 and 478, Fernández-Galiano 263, Simpson 121, Lehnus 158.

A second "native" exemplar–"native" despite the fact that his father Menoitios was only, as it were, a "naturalized" immigrant to Opous[22]–is available in Patroklos, and in him the poet recognizes more extensive paradigmatic possibilities. The particular incident in which Patroklos' courage and determination as a warrior, his βιατὰς νόος, present themselves to the poet's mind is one that dates from a very early stage in his fighting career, namely when the Greek army, seeking to make its way to Troy, landed on the shore of Mysia and was driven back to its ships by Telephos. In standing his ground against a foe whose onslaught was so fierce that it routed the rest of the "valiant Danaans" *en masse* (ἀλκάεντας Δαναοὺς τρέψαις 72), Patroklos can serve as a complimentary parallel to Epharmostos' own defensive valor or ἀλκά as manifested in his effective resistance against, and ultimate triumph over, formidable opposition at Marathon. In each case we have a "defining moment" near the beginning of the hero's career which, in displaying his steadfastness (cf. ἔστα 71, μένεν 90) to interested onlookers (cf. ὥστ' ἔμφρονι δεῖξαι 74, διήρχετο κύκλον ὅσσᾳ βοᾷ 93), prognosticates illustrious achievements in time to come.[23]

Although in addition to Opous and Patroklos, the Lokrian nation could lay claim to at least one other well-known figure from the heroic age, Ajax the son of Oileus, he will remain (apart from one brief allusion in the final lines) conspicuously absent from the finished ode, perhaps because his problematic reputation for brutality and sacrilege makes him unsuitable for encomiastic purposes.[24] In the evident belief, however, that Epharmostos' prowess is deserving of still further elaboration and illustration, the poet "invents"—possibly in more than simply the rhetorical sense[25]—a third exemplum that is,

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[22]Cf. *Il.* 18.326, 23.85. Patroklos is also cited as a paradigmatic figure in *O.* 10.16ff., composed for an Epizephyrian Lokrian.

[23]On the Patroklos/Epharmostos parallel see Simpson 121f (who however attempts unnecessarily to strengthen the parallel by emending οἷον in line 89 to οἷος) and Carey 152. Patroklos' encomiastic relevance is recognized (although not defined in any detail) by the scholia (e.g., Σ 119e). The notion that part of Pindar's intention is to suggest a parallel between Epharmostos' relationship with Lampromachos and Patroklos' with Achilles (so, e.g., Boeckh 192, Bossler 200-201, Mezger 471, Christ 75, Puech 422, Bernardini 147-48) is rightly rejected as unlikely by Hubbard 121 n. 58, who points out that if Lampromachos is a relative (so Boeckh, Bossler, Christ), the analogy is inexact, and if he is a friend (so Mezger, Bernardini), his inclusion in the victory-catalogue is unparalleled.

[24]Cf. Fernández-Galiano 269, Méautis 416-18, Bernardini 153-54. As Bernardini remarks, however, Méautis overstates the case when he calls the ode "pas seulement une protestation, mais un véritable réquisitoire dirigé contre l'attitude d'Ajax" (418).

[25]Molyneux exhaustively reviews the evidence for Herakles' battles with Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades, gives good reasons for thinking that Pindar intends to be understood as referring to

relative to the Opountian mythographic tradition, *allotrion* rather than *oikeion*.[26] The fact that the games held at Marathon were Herakleia (cf. Σ 134e, 137a) may have been responsible for bringing Herakles to the poet's mind in the first place, but he is in any case *a propos* on other grounds, both general and specific. He is, to begin with, a prime embodiment of agonistic labor and thus a fitting model for any athlete who pursues the heavy combat sports in which πόνος looms so large, boxing and the *pankration* as well as wrestling.[27] Then too, as a son of Zeus who manifested extraordinary capacities and talents from his earliest infancy (as Pindar so vividly relates in *N.* 1), Herakles far surpasses Opous in stature and fame as an exemplar of ability possessed φυᾷ or σὺν θεῷ. Although in the finished ode the summary account of Herakles' *theomachia* presents the results of such ability without explicitly calling attention to its source, we shall shortly see how Pindar contrives to have the relevance of the exemplum to Epharmostos' own remarkable catalogue of victories and its gnomic coda clearly signaled by the maxim that motivates its introduction (ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες / ἐγένοντ' 28f). Finally, whatever may be the specific incident (or incidents) that the poet has in mind, the image of Herakles withstanding the hostile pressure of three gods (note the emphatic repetition in 31f, ἤρειδε...ἤρειδεν) and winning through to victory in the end provides another mythical prototype for Epharmostos' triumph over formidable adversaries at Marathon. In this case, moreover, the implied parallel is even closer than in the case of Patroklos holding his ground against the onslaught of Telephos, since here too a solitary warrior encounters

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a single occasion, rejects the possibility of deliberate innovation, and concludes that Pindar is following an earlier account featuring Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades all together (or at least Poseidon and Hades, with Apollo "accidentally added"). The more generally accepted view is that attributed in the scholia to Didymus (Σ 44a), namely that Pindar has taken what the tradition knew as three separate encounters and artfully recast them as a single episode in order to magnify Herakles' achievement (so, e.g., Boeckh 189, Mezger 473, Gildersleeve 205, Christ 72, Fraccaroli 317, Puech 417, Carey 151 n. 36, Bernardini 131-32).

[26]On the Herakles/Epharmostos parallel see, e.g., Boeckh 189, Dissen 112, Bossler 198, Christ 72, Puech 417, Simpson 119-21 (although he attributes the "dangerous" comparison not to Pindar himself but to Epharmostos' companions when singing the Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος), Carey 152, Bernardini 129-30. On Heracles as an *allotrion paradeigma* cf. Bernardini 137 and Privitera 52-54, both of whom aptly cite the rejection of Herakles as a theme in favor of the Aiakidai in *N.* 3.26ff. Bundy 9 appears to take the mythical paradigm as "subjective" rather than "objective" in application: "The implication is that it would take the divine strength and daring of a Herakles to equal in praise the divine merits of the Opountians."

[27]On Herakles as "Vorbild des Schwerathleten" see K. Kramer, *Studien zur griechischen Agonistik nach den Epinikien Pindars* (Cologne 1970) 108-38 and P. A. Bernardini, "Esaltazione e critica dell'atletismo nella poesia greca dal VII al V sec. a.C.: storia di un' ideologia," *Stadion* 6 (1980) 81-111 (102-103).

a plurality of opponents who are, so to speak, his ontological superiors (as a youth against men, so a mortal hero against gods).[28] For all the manifold relevance of the Herakles-paradigm to his encomiastic purposes, however, its use poses several tactical problems for Pindar, problems which he solves through his adroitness in *dispositio*, to which we shall now turn.

II. Dispositio

After *inventio*, *dispositio*: having identified and (where necessary) generated the various materials out of which his discourse is to be constructed, the speaker or writer then faces the task of arranging them in a linear sequence that will be intelligible in itself and that will allow the individual elements to have their maximum effect. The materials out of which the encomiastic argument of *O.* 9 is to be constructed are in part atechnic (Epharmostos' agonistic record, handed to the poet along with his commission), in part entechnic (enthymematic reflections on *phua* and the paradigmatic figures of Opous, Patroklos, and Herakles, all "invented" through meditation on the given facts). But of course a collection of "proofs" in support of a thesis does not in and of itself constitute coherent discourse, let alone an aesthetically satisfying poem. In the preface to Book 7 of the *Institutio Oratoria,* Quintilian compares such materials to the piles of stone and timber that require the shaping craft of masons in order to become a building and then concludes:

> so in speaking, however abundant the matter may be, it will merely form a confused heap (*cumulum tantum habeat atque congestum*) unless arrangement be employed to reduce it to order and to give it connection and firmness of structure (*nisi illas eadem dispositio in ordinem digestas atque inter se commissas devinxerit*).

It is important to note, however, that *dispositio* involves not only arranging the major blocks or "parts" of a discourse "in order" but also securing cohesion of thought and smoothness of movement *within* and *between* the parts. Quintilian opens the discussion of "arrangement" to which Book 7 as a whole is devoted by distinguishing in passing between *dispositio* as the "distribution of things and parts to the places which it is expedient that they should occupy" (*utilis*

[28] "Whatever Pindar may say elsewhere about the ultimate divine status of Heracles (e.g., *Ol.* 3.36)," remarks Molyneux 317 n. 39, "he is obviously mentioned here in illustration of ἄνδρες." On Herakles and Epharmostos as each "fighting out of his class" see Simpson 120.

rerum ac partium in locos distributio) and *ordo* as the "correct placing together of things in such a way that what follows coheres with what precedes" (*recta quaedam collocatio prioribus sequentia adnectens*) (7.1.1). Although the terminological distinction is one that he appears expressly to repudiate elsewhere in the work,[29] he returns to and elaborates upon the underlying point in the concluding chapter of the book (7.10.16-17):

> It is not enough merely to arrange the various parts: each several part has its own internal economy, according to which one thought will come first, another second, another third, while we must struggle not merely to place these thoughts in their proper order, but to link them together and give them such cohesion that there will be no trace of any suture (*ut inter se vincti atque ita cohaerentes, ne commissura perluceat*): they must form a body, not a collection of limbs.... Thus different facts will not seem like perfect strangers thrust into uncongenial company from distant places, but will be united with what precedes and follows by an intimate bond of union (*aliqua societate cum prioribus ac sequentibus copulatae tenebuntur*), with the result that our speech will give the impression not merely of having been put together, but of natural continuity (*videbitur non solum composita oratio, sed etiam continua*).

These formulations are useful in pointing to two distinct aspects of "arrangement" as a phase in the compositional process that produces an epinician ode. In order to turn an argument for his client's praiseworthiness into poetic discourse, the poet must not only organize the individual elements out of which that argument is composed (i.e., the atechnic and entechnic proofs) into a suitable and effective sequence (Quintilian's *utilis rerum ac partium in locos distributio*) but also contrive an intelligible and plausible progression of thought from element to element within that sequence (Quintilian's *recta collocatio prioribus sequentia adnectens*). Among the heterogeneous assortment of materials, given and invented, there is likely to be a variety of conceptual interrelations but no single *necessary* order, since each of the *pisteis* bears on the encomiastic thesis independently; yet somehow the poet must transform them into coherent, sequentially intelligible, plausibly *continuous* speech. Although the finished ode's discourse may begin at any point the poet chooses, Pindar's aesthetic sense seems to demand that once silence has been broken, everything must appear to emerge naturally and persuasively from what

[29]E.g., at 3.3.8: "Others, who seem to me to have been no less desirous to introduce some novelty, have added 'order,' although they had already mentioned 'disposition,' as though disposition was anything else than the marshalling of arguments in the best possible order (*rerum ordine quam optimo collocatio*)."

precedes and lead naturally and persuasively into what follows until a point is reached at which, as regards both the poet's responsibilities and the expectations of the audience, nothing further need be said. From this perspective *dispositio* is no mere mechanical arrangement of "parts" but involves instead a minutely careful plotting of moves and motivations such that *sequentia* are linked to *priora* in logically coherent and/or psychologically verisimilar fashion.

Pindar's chief means to this end is what has been called the "oral subterfuge," the fiction according to which the epinician ode is the spontaneously unfolding utterance of an extemporizing speaker (the "I" of the poem) who exhibits the impulsiveness, the digressiveness, the false starts and self-corrections of ordinary unpremeditated speech.[30] Through this mimetic representation of a person intently engaged in the generation and formulation of his thoughts at the very moment of public utterance, Pindar gains for himself great freedom in the disposition of his multiform material; not only does the carefully sustained illusion of spontaneity permit all manner of stops and starts and changes of direction, but persuasively verisimilar motivation for those stops, starts, and changes of direction can be supplied by the speaker's supposed state of mind and feeling. Thus in the finished ode, rhetorical argumentation and dramatic mimesis are inextricably entwined: an act of discourse that may appear to reflect the momentary impulses and ratiocinations of the "I" who speaks is in fact carefully "plotted" to include all that Pindar himself wants and needs to have said in order to fulfill his encomiastic obligations. For this reason it is important to distinguish between two quite different senses in which one can speak of the "argument" of a Pindaric epinician. In one sense of the term, the argument of the ode is the underlying thesis that the poem *qua* encomium is required to establish ("X is praiseworthy") together with the various *pisteis* through which the validity of that thesis is demonstrated; in the other sense, it is the poem's unfolding train of thought or *Gedankengang*, its logical and/or psychological step-by-step progression from first to final sentence.

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[30]For the term "oral subterfuge" see C. Carey, *A Commentary on Fives Odes of Pindar* (Salem, New Hampshire 1980) 5; for further discussion and illustration of the concept see A. M. Miller, "Pindaric Mimesis: The Associative Mode," *CJ* 89 (1993) 21-53. To what extent and in what ways the extemporizing epinician "I" is to be identified with Pindar himself are questions too complex for discussion here; valuable insights are to be found in M. R. Lefkowitz, *First-Person Fictions: Pindar's Poetic "I"* (Oxford 1991), particularly the chapter entitled "Autobiographical Fiction in Pindar."

In the case of *O.* 9, the central thesis explicitly propounded at the level of the *Gedankengang* is not simply "Epharmostos is praiseworthy," but rather "the city of Opous *and* Epharmostos are praiseworthy." In other words, the ode has what Erasmus Schmid in his elaborate rhetorical schema of the poem aptly calls a *propositio bimembris*.[31] Of course praise of a victor's city, redounding as it necessarily does to the victor's own credit, is a standard and expected element in epinician odes,[32] but rarely is it so explicitly proclaimed as a theme co-equal with that of the victor as it is in *O.* 9.14, and it is this explicit announcement of a double encomiastic focus that proves to be the key to Pindar's dispositional strategy in the ode. Since I cannot here trace every single step in the poem's unfolding train of thought, I shall concentrate on demonstrating how Pindar uses the device of the *propositio bimembris* to organize and motivate his chief "proofs" of Epharmostos' praiseworthiness (agonistic record, gnomic reflections on natural ability, mythical paradigms).

For the speaker's starting-point, Pindar chooses what has necessarily been his own point of departure in the process of composition, Epharmostos' current victory at Olympia, with an earlier success at Pytho appended as a brief addendum; beginning with the two most prestigious items in his client's agonistic record accords with the principle enunciated at *O.* 6.3f as ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου πρόσωπον / χρὴ θέμεν τηλαυγές.[33] The specific means by which the speaker reports the Olympian triumph is an elaborately worked-out contrast between two distinct phases in the celebration such an exploit inspires: spontaneous revelry with friends at the time of the event itself and the subsequent production and performance of a formal *epinikion*.

Τὸ μὲν Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος
φωνᾶεν Ὀλυμπίᾳ,
καλλίνικος ὁ τριπλόος κεχλαδώς,
ἄρκεσε Κρόνιον παρ' ὄχθον ἀγεμονεῦσαι
κωμάζοντι φίλοις Ἐφαρμόστῳ σὺν ἑταίροις·
ἀλλὰ νῦν ἑκαταβόλων Μοισᾶν ἀπὸ τόξων
Δία τε φοινικοστερόπαν σεμνόν τ' ἐπίνειμαι

[31]Schmid 235. In his commentary Schmid refers to the poet's "Propositio, quam duabus membris includit, q. d. *Laudanda est Opus patria Epharmosti: Laudandus etiam est ipse Epharmostus*" (244).

[32]Cf. Chapter IV ("Das Lob der Heimat des Siegers") in Thummer.

[33]So too in *O.* 7, also composed for a *periodonikês*, Diagoras' Olympian and Pythian victories are reported in the first triad while the Isthmians and Nemeans, together with numerous local wins, are postponed until the last.

ἀκρωτήριον Ἄλιδος
τοιοῖσδε βέλεσσιν,
τὸ δή ποτε Λυδὸς ἥρως Πέλοψ
10 ἐξάρατο κάλλιστον ἔδνον Ἱπποδαμείας·

> The song of Archilochos sounding forth at Olympia, the swelling threefold victory-hymn, sufficed to lead Epharmostos to the hill of Kronos as he marched in triumph with his dear comrades. Now, however, from the bow of the far-shooting Muses launch a shower of darts such as these at Zeus of the crimson lightning and at the hallowed height of Elis, which once the Lydian hero Pelops won for himself as Hippodameia's fairest marriage-gift.

Whereas the earlier phase has as its own melic component the τήνελλα καλλίνικε attributed to Archilochos, in which temporal and emotional immediacy is offset by a merely generic appropriateness of content, the formal ode produced through the agency of the "far-shooting Muses" combines greater distance (both temporal and spatial) from the occasion of victory with a uniquely specific applicability to the case at hand.[34] Though the generic congratulatory effusion "sufficed" Epharmostos *then*, he *now* needs something both more pointed and more thorough, and this the speaker exhorts himself to supply. In the self-exhortation, moreover, he demonstrates the very qualities required through his rapid-fire but comprehensive coverage of the topic immediately to hand, the Olympian festival itself, for in short order he designates its presiding deity (Δία), local landmark (ἀκρωτήριον), surrounding region (Ἄλιδος), and tutelary hero (Πέλοψ).

The transition between the initial statement of the basic facts of victory and the enunciation of the ode's *propositio bimembris* is mediated by the extension of the imagery of the "archery of song" into the first antistrophe, in which the speaker begins with a passing reference to Pytho and then assures himself that, given such themes as he can lay claim to by virtue of his encomiastic task, he cannot fail of producing efficacious speech:

11 πτερόεντα δ' ἴει γλυκύν
Πυθῶνάδ' οἴστόν· οὗτοι χαμαιπετέων λόγων ἐφάψεαι,
ἀνδρὸς ἀμφὶ παλαίσμασιν φόρμιγγ' ἐλελίζων
κλεινᾶς ἐξ Ὀπόεντος· αἰνήσαις ἔ καὶ υἱόν....

[34]On the contrast between general and specific applicability see Σ 1i, Simpson 115, Bernardini 123-24, and K. A. Morgan, "Pindar the Professional and the Rhetoric of the Κῶμος," *CP* 88 (1993) 1-15 (3-4).

> And shoot toward Pytho a winged arrow of sweet song. You may be sure that the words you lay hands on will not fall to the ground when you set the lyre vibrating in honor of the wrestling-bouts of a man from famous Opous. Praise her and her son....

While these lines add two necessary items of information (event and city) to the initial statement of Epharmostos' current achievement, they also explicitly announce that the speaker's attention in the following discourse will be focused not only on Epharmostos but also on the community whose "son" he is. By thus setting up in the audience the clear expectation that the speaker will first deal with Topic A and then move on to Topic B, Pindar plausibly motivates the eventual introduction not only of two *oikeia paradeigmata* (Opous and Patroklos), which will emerge naturally out of the chronological survey of Opountian history into which the topic "praise of the city" eventually resolves itself,[35] but also of Epharmostos' victory catalogue and the gnomic reflections on his extraordinary natural ability, which will be brought in smoothly by the long-anticipated shift of attention from the first to the second half of the *propositio bimembris*. There is one important element in the underlying encomiastic argument, however, that the double-barrelled theme-announcement *cannot* accommodate, namely the paradigmatic figure of Herakles, who as an "alien example" lacks mythographic or genealogical connection with city and victor alike. In some way, therefore, Pindar has to contrive a plausible scenario whereby the speaker can hold onto the thread of his twofold thesis while simultaneously introducing a subject that has—overtly, at any rate—nothing to do with either of its aspects.[36] Pindar finds his solution in the "oral subterfuge," artfully plotting a series of small steps, each perfectly logical in itself, by which the speaker can "stray" into (ostensible) irrelevance through ratiocination.

The ground is laid for this adroit maneuver when the speaker begins to realize his announced "praise of Opous" with a summary statement of the city's claims to fame in the political and agonistic spheres: Opous cultivates the civic

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[35]On the "opuntische Geschlechtssage" as "eine unmittelbare Fortsetzung oder Ausführung eines Programmpunktes, des Lobpreises der Vaterstadt," see Illig 84.

[36]Although in his commentary Schmid accurately defines the function of the Herakles-exemplum on the level of the ode's unfolding train of thought (see below, n. 43), in his rhetorical schema of the ode Herakles is conspicuously—and significantly—absent. Schmid's dilemma is that although the lines on Herakles clearly have nothing to contribute to the "confirmatio prioris membri de Opunte," their position in the ode apparently precludes their being part of the "confirmatio posterioris membri de Epharmosto."

virtues of respect for law and political stability, and it "burgeons" with athletic accomplishments of the very highest order, not merely Panhellenic but Pythian and Olympian.

15 ἂν Θέμις θυγάτηρ τέ οἱ σώτειρα λέλογχεν
μεγαλόδοξος Εὐνομία. θάλλει δ' ἀρεταῖσιν
σόν τε, Κασταλία, πάρα
'Αλφεοῦ τε ῥέεθρον·
ὅθεν στεφάνων ἄωτοι κλυτάν
20 Λοκρῶν ἐπαείροντι ματέρ' ἀγλαόδενδρον.

...she it is whom Themis and her savior daughter claim as their own, Eunomia of great fame; and she flourishes with deeds of prowess both beside *your* stream, Kastalia, and that of the Alpheios too, whence come the choicest crowns to exalt the Lokrians' mother-city with her splendid trees.

The city's devotion to Themis and Eunomia does not seem to bear directly on Epharmostos himself (there is nothing to suggest that the kind of citizen he is is a point at issue in the ode)[37] but simply provides the substrate of social order that makes pursuit of the agonistic enterprise possible.[38] On the other hand, the statement that "Opous flourishes with deeds of prowess at Pytho and Olympia" does indeed redound to Epharmostos' credit, and does so whether θάλλει is to be understood as particular ('flourishes *on this occasion*') or general ('*habitually* flourishes') in its reference. Taken as particular, the statement reiterates Epharmostos' achievements in terms of their beneficial effect on the city as a whole (and so magnifies their importance); taken as general, it enunciates a general principle that Epharmostos has upheld in the present instance (he has not let the tradition down, not sullied it with the disgrace of being tested and found wanting).

At this point, for the first time in the ode, the speaker brings himself emphatically forward by means of a personal pronoun, and the maneuvers that will culminate in (and justify) the introduction of Herakles begin in earnest:

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[37]Contrast such odes as, e.g., *O.* 4, *O.* 7, *O.* 13, *P.* 11, *I.* 3, and *I.* 4, in which the laudandus' relations with his fellow-citizens are an important item in the poet's encomiastic armory.

[38]Similarly in *O.* 13.14f the Corinthians' illustrious record in athletic competition is attributed (in figurative fashion) to their cultivation of "Good Order," "Justice," and "Peace"; presumably the implication is that citizen-athletes can have the means, the energy, and the leisure to compete only if they are not continually embroiled in factional strife with their fellows. Cf. also the pairing of μοῖρα εὔνομος and ἀγλαΐαι ἀστύνομοι in *N.* 9.29ff.

—
ἐγὼ δέ τοι φίλαν πόλιν
μαλεραῖς ἐπιφλέγων ἀοιδαῖς,
καὶ ἀγάνορος ἵππου
θᾶσσον καὶ ναὸς ὑποπτέρου παντᾷ
ἀγγελίαν πέμψω ταύταν,
εἰ σύν τινι μοιριδίῳ παλάμᾳ
ἐξαίρετον Χαρίτων νέμομαι κᾶπον·
κεῖναι γὰρ ὥπασαν τὰ τέρπν'· ἀγαθοὶ
δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες
)—
ἐγένοντ'·

As for me, setting the city of my friends ablaze with fiery songs, swifter than a high-spirited horse or winged ship I will send this announcement in all directions, if it is with some destined skill that I cultivate the choice garden of the Graces. *They* are the ones, after all, who bestow what is delightful, and men prove to be brave as well as skilled as divinity determines.

Having first proudly proclaimed himself as the agent through whom "this announcement," i.e., the preceding vaunt about the civic virtues and (especially) the agonistic achievements of Opous, will be propagated throughout the world, "faster than a spirited horse or a winged ship," he immediately qualifies the assertion by adding a conditional protasis: he will succeed in spreading the word about Opous *if* (and only if) it truly is the case that he "cultivates the choice garden of the Graces with a skill that has been granted by destiny:" in other words, if his persuasive abilities are divinely derived (or, viewed from another perspective, possessed "by nature"). He then goes on to explain *why* he must "cultivate the garden of the Graces" effectively in order to ensure the transmission of his "message": not only do the Graces hold the power of attractive (and hence persuasive) speech within their gift, as they do everything that is delightful and pleasant in this world, but–and here the speaker proceeds to generalize–*all* desirable qualities, courage and skill among them, come to human beings "in accordance with divine will," as a scholiast paraphrases (κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ θεῶν Σ 40).[39]

By the time the speaker has traced out his line of thought to its gnomic conclusion in ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες ἐγένοντ', Pindar's compositional objective—the plausible introduction of paradigmatic material

[39]On ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοί as "eine das Ganze vertretende Polarität" see Bischoff 24.

whose presence in the ode the occasion alone cannot adequately motivate—has been all but achieved. The speaker has in turn qualified, explained, and generalized each thought as it has come to him. His final step is to confirm and illustrate the general truth by invoking an apposite example in the persuasive form of a rhetorical question.[40]

ἐπεὶ ἀντίον
πῶς ἂν τριόδοντος Ἡ-
ρακλέης σκύταλον τίναξε χερσίν,
ἀνίκ' ἀμφὶ Πύλον σταθεὶς ἤρειδε Ποσειδάν,
ἤρειδεν δέ νιν ἀργυρέῳ τόξῳ πολεμίζων
Φοῖβος, οὐδ' Ἀΐδας ἀκινήταν ἔχε ῥάβδον,
βρότεα σώμαθ' ᾗ κατάγει κοίλαν πρὸς ἄγυιαν
θνᾳσκόντων;

> For how else could Herakles have brandished his club against the trident, that time when, standing in defense of Pylos, Poseidon pressed hard upon him, and hard upon him pressed Phoibos, doing battle with his silver bow, nor did Hades keep his rod unmoved, that rod with which he leads mortal bodies down to his hollow halls when men are dying?

Were it *not* the case that human abilities are divinely derived, how could Herakles (who though the son of Zeus was also—until his death, at any rate—a mortal man) have successfully withstood in battle three such opponents as Poseidon, Apollo, and Hades?[41]

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[40]The artful manner in which the gnome facilitates the introduction of Herakles by generalizing the preceding thought is noted by Benedictus 168: "confirmatio rationis a generali sententia.... Praeterea his verbis sibi sternit viam ad fabulam Herculei roboris." G. Perrotta overstates the case with characteristic literal-mindedness when he characterizes the gnome as "soltanto un pretesto per legare il mito a quello che precede" (*Saffo e Pindaro* [Bari 1935] 136): however neatly it may serve as a "legame meccanico" in the unfolding train of thought, it also makes a substantive contribution to the praise of Epharmostos.

[41]This interpretation of the passage, according to which ἐπεί = 'for otherwise,' has been accepted by the majority of scholars from the scholiasts onward. Farnell 69, however, argues on the basis of the speaker's subsequent rejection of the story that ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν must = 'for how could it have been true that...?', and his reasoning is accepted by, e.g., Bowra 55, Simpson 123 with n. 37, and Nisetich 122. For a thorough discussion of the question in terms of syntax and logic, see Molyneux 302-303 and 313-27. Scholars since Molyneux who have argued for the traditional interpretation include Stinton 67-68, Carey 151-3, Bernardini 126-35, Hubbard 118-20 with n. 53, and Privitera 49-50. Bernardini and Hubbard both assume an implicit allusion to the tradition whereby Herakles received assistance at Pylos from Athena (cf. Paus. VI.25.2), a possibility which was long ago considered and rejected—rightly, I believe—by Dissen 112 as "alienum... ab hoc loco; nam de naturae vi divinitus innata Pindarus loquitur, quare nititur totus locus."

It should be noted that of the two main paradigmatic functions served by Herakles on the level of the ode's underlying encomiastic argument—as an illustration of the supreme efficacy of abilities possessed φυᾷ or σὺν θεῷ and as a heroic prototype of Epharmostos' resistance against apparently overwhelming odds at Marathon—only the former is explicitly signaled on the level of the text; the latter is left for the audience to understand on its own, if not immediately then at least in retrospect when the Marathonian exploit is presented. It should also be noted that when the speaker cites Herakles as an illustration of the importance of *phua* he does so in ostensible relation to *himself* rather than to the victor, although of course the first of the two categories in the "polar doublet" of ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοί implicitly includes Epharmostos as well as Herakles. This refusal to bring Herakles into overt relation with Epharmostos is part of Pindar's response to a second tactical problem that the exemplum poses: in addition to being "foreign" or "alien," it is also more than a trifle grandiose. Although Herakles' victory over three gods and Epharmostos' victory over "elders" are patently analogous, the discrepancy in stature between the hero and the beardless youth remains so vast that any sort of direct comparison would be indecorous, even absurd, rather than complimentary.[42] Pindar's adroitness in suggesting, without stating, the similarities that link Epharmostos to his mythical prototype allows him to have his rhetorical cake and eat it too.

If the indirection with which Herakles' theomachy is introduced helps to avert the danger of indecorum, however, so too does the manner of its dismissal. Although sufficient detail is given (focusing chiefly on the combatants' weapons) to suggest the wonder of his triumph against well-nigh overwhelming odds, Pindar sees to it that further elaboration of the tale is cut short by a negative reaction on the speaker's part, whom he represents as having been seduced by argumentative zeal into broaching a story of which he cannot, upon further reflection, approve:[43]

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[42]Cf., e.g., Dissen 114 and Simpson 119-122 (on which see below, n. 55). As Hayden Pelliccia points out to me, the principle of decorum in the drawing of comparisons is one that Odysseus formulates when, having proclaimed himself to be superior to all his contemporaries (Philoktetes aside) as an archer, he then remarks: ἀνδράσι δὲ προτέροισι ἐριζέμεν οὐκ ἐθελήσω, / οὔθ' Ἡρακλῆϊ οὔτ' Εὐρύτῳ Οἰχαλιῆϊ, / οἵ ῥα καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἐρίζεσκον περὶ τόξων (*Od.* 8. 223ff).

[43]Schmid 246 offers an interesting analysis of the passage in terms of a conflict between its logical function relative to the immediately preceding *gnome* and its ethical impropriety relative to the poet's larger rhetorical "case": "Rejicit nunc exempla hactenus adducta, quae ad Thesin quidem confirmandam faciunt, nimirum ἀγαθοὺς καὶ σοφοὺς ἄνδρας κατὰ δαίμονα

35 ἀπό μοι λόγον
τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥῖψον·
ἐπεὶ τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεούς
__ ἐχθρὰ σοφία, καὶ τὸ καυχᾶσθαι παρὰ καιρόν
μανίαισιν ὑποκρέκει.

Cast away this story, O my mouth! For to revile the gods is a hateful exercise of skill, and to make large claims inopportunely has the ring of madness.

The speaker advances two distinct reasons for rejecting his own *logos*, the first of which ("To speak slightingly of the gods is an odious misuse of wit") involves considerations of piety, the second ("To persist in making large claims inopportunely is tantamount to madness") considerations of relevance.[44] To assert that Apollo, Poseidon, and Hades were worsted by one who, as a mortal man, was their ontological inferior is to cast divinity in general in an unfavorable light, and such impious λοιδορία is on principle best avoided. For all that, one must note the emphasis which the phrase παρὰ καιρόν receives from its exposed position at the end of its line and strophe. The implication seems to be that if it were currently the speaker's real business to talk about Herakles, there might be some point in chancing vaunts on his behalf, but to risk blasphemy while speaking on a subject quite unconnected with what *is* his business at the moment, namely praise of Opous, would be, in a word, "crazy." Thus the speaker's "spontaneous" outburst of self-reproach is calculated to

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γενέσθαι: in Hypothesi vero tolerari non possunt, ut pote in Deos injuriosa & contumeliosa, quae unum hominem tribus Diis potentiorem faciunt." (On the traditional distinction between *thesis* and *hypothesis* which Schmid invokes here see Lausberg 61-63 and W. Trimpi, *Muses of One Mind: The Literary Analysis of Experience and its Continuity* [Princeton 1983] 28-34). It is a matter of the greatest importance, both here and in similar passages like *O.* 1.28ff and *N.* 5.14ff, that the distinction between the speaker and the composer of the ode be carefully observed: if the *former* experiences a sudden ethical reaction against the story he has just told, he does so because the *latter* has chosen to realize certain compositional and rhetorical objectives through such "dramatic" means. On this point as it bears on *O.* 9.37ff, see in particular Stinton 68, Carey 153 with n. 43, and H. Pelliccia, "Sappho 16, Gorgias' *Helen*, and the Preface to Herodotus' *Histories*," *YCS* 26 (1992) 61-82 (62-63).

[44]The two motivations, religious sensibility and respect for *kairos*, are well distinguished by Bischoff 24, Bernardini 134, and Privitera 51-54. It should be noted that nothing the speaker says brings the *truth* of the story into question; in this respect the passage differs significantly from *O.* 1.25ff, an otherwise quite similar "false-start recusatio" (to use the term coined by H. Pelliccia; see reference in previous note). The aspectual force of the present infinitive καυχᾶσθαι ('to keep on uttering vaunts') is noted by Gildersleeve 205 and Privitera 53.

serve two functions simultaneously. On the level of the ode's overall encomiastic argument, it constitutes an apologetic acknowledgment, even a kind of exorcism, of whatever "boastful" overstatement may be involved in the unspoken analogy between Herakles' exploit and that of Epharmostos, while on the level of the ode's unfolding *Gedankengang* it motivates and initiates the return to Opous as a topic of discourse after what one scholiast characterizes as the "inopportune and unnecessary narrative" of lines 29ff (ταῖς οὕτως ἀκαίροις ⟨καὶ⟩ οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις διηγήσεσι Σ 58).

The *reditus ad propositum* itself is effected in lines 40ff.

40 μὴ νῦν λαλάγει τὰ τοι-
αῦτ'· ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν
χωρὶς ἀθανάτων· φέροις δὲ Πρωτογενείας
ἄστει γλῶσσαν, ἵν' αἰολοβρέντα Διὸς αἴσᾳ
Πύρρα Δευκαλίων τε Παρνασσοῦ καταβάντε
δόμον ἔθεντο πρῶτον, ἄτερ δ' εὐνᾶς ὁμόδαμον
45 κτισσάσθαν λίθινον γόνον·
λαοὶ δ' ὀνύμασθεν.

> Stop prattling now about such things; keep war and battle of every kind apart from the immortals; and bring your speech to bear on Protogeneia's city, where by the dispensation of Zeus with the flashing thunderbolt Pyrrha and Deukalion, after coming down from Parnassos, first established their home, and without recourse to the marriage-bed created a stony race to be of one community with them; and they were named "the people."

Now is not the time to "chatter on" about warfare with the gods, says the speaker to himself; 'at this moment' and 'under these circumstances' (the νῦν of line 40 seems to combine both senses) he owes his powers of speech to the "dear city" whose praises he had been singing before ratiocination led him astray into "inopportune and unnecessary narrative." The community which forms one half of the speaker's twofold theme is now referred to not by its proper name (as it was when the theme was originally announced) but as "the city of Protogeneia," a locution which forecasts what will prove to be a key element in the upcoming chronological survey of early Opountian history, namely the begetting of the city's eponymous hero (and consequent renewal of its royal line) through Zeus's union with the daughter of Opous, king of Elis. That Pindar intends the name to be understood as referring to the mother of the younger Opous rather than (or perhaps in addition to) the daughter of Deukalion and Pyrrha, as the dominant tradition would have it, seems certain

in light of his normal practice in the handling of names.[45] If, however, some members of the audience should initially understand Πρωτογενείας ἄστει as a reference to the daughter of Deukalion and Pyrrha—and the fact that that primeval pair dominates the lines which immediately follow not only would excuse momentary confusion on that score but may even be intended to create it[46]—Pindar takes care to have the speaker immediately put them on their guard by means of a programmatic interjection:

47 ἔγειρ' ἐπέων σφιν οἶμον λιγύν,
__ αἴνει δὲ παλαιὸν μὲν οἶνον, ἄνθεα δ' ὕμνων
νεωτέρων.

Awake for them [i.e., the Opountians][47] a clear-sounding path of words;
praise wine that is old, but the flowers of newer songs.

Line 47 reiterates once again (cf. 14, 21f, 41f) the speaker's encomiastic intention vis-à-vis the victor's city; lines 48f. make use of a "two-term priamel" to recommend "newness" or "novelty" in song and thus to enhance the importance

[45]Cf. Illig 85 n. 3, Puech 427. Others who understand the Protogeneia of l. 41 to be the daughter of Opous I and mother of Opous II (whether or not Pindar also accepted the existence of an earlier Protogeneia, the daughter of Deukalion and Pyrrha) include Σ 62b and d, 64c, Dissen 114-15, K. Friederichs, "Erklärungen zu Pindar's Epinikien," *Philologus* 15 (1860) 33, Bossler 203-205, Mezger 474, Fennell 99, Wilamowitz 359-60, Bernardini 141-142. According to Huxley 31 (followed by Nisetich 123), the daughter of Opous of Elis was Kaphya (cf. Plut. *Quaest. Gr.* 15), a fact at which Pindar cleverly hints with his passing reference to Mount Mainalos, on the slopes of which the town of Kaphyai was situated.

[46]Although to some (e.g., Boeckh 190, Huxley 31) the close proximity of the names Πρωτογενείας and Πύρρα Δευκαλίων τε is an argument against taking the former as referring to the daughter of Opous I, Illig 85 n. 3 aptly cites the parallel of *O.* 1.25ff, where Pindar intentionally misleads his audience by including certain details (the cauldron and the ivory shoulder) which the speaker will soon disavow. One should note, though, that whereas in *O.* 1 the "standard" version of the myth is explicitly rejected as incompatible with the second, in *O.* 9 the two can in fact co-exist (on the assumption of there being not one but two Protogeneias); all that the audience is asked to revise is its understanding (if it had such an understanding) that Πρωτογενείας ἄστει alludes *only* to the daughter of Deukalion and Pyrrha.

[47]That σφιν refers to the Opountians (or Lokrians) generally is the view of, e.g., Σ 72b, Boeckh 190, Mezger 474, Fennell 99, Illig 81 n. 3. Other possible referents are Deukalion and Pyrrha (cf., e.g., Fehr 109) and the λαοί (cf., e.g., Puech 427, Bernardini 141), but the particular "path of song" that follows has nothing more to say about (or in honor of) either of these parties. For an unspecified "they" referring to the people of a city mentioned earlier, cf. *N.* 7.10 (ἐθέλοντι immediately following πόλιν...Αἰακιδᾶν) and *O.* 13.9 (ἐθέλοντι five lines after τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον).

of this particular "path of song."[48] Even if the transference of Protogeneia's name from the "first-born" daughter of Deukalion and Pyrrha to the daughter of an Elean king is not literally an "innovation" on Pindar's part, it certainly can be represented as such by comparison with the standard account.[49] Thus primed to be on the lookout for unfamiliar (or less familiar) elements, the audience will readily connect the otherwise unnamed woman in lines 57ff with the Protogeneia of line 41 *retrospectively* even if they understood the reference differently at the time that it was originally made. The underlying purpose in Pindar's handling of the myth is presumably to establish an ancestral connection between Opous and Elis renewed in the present by Epharmostos' victory at Olympia.[50]

Structurally, the "lay of Opous" which begins in line 42 and is explicitly labeled as an οἶμος in line 47 takes the form of a triptych in which the three main "panels" are linked by brief passages of summary statement. The first panel, concerning Deukalion and Pyrrha, is divided into two installments by the programmatic commendation of "newness" in lines 47-49. In the first of these installments the speaker tells how the pair came down from Parnassos, established a home for themselves, and "without recourse to the marriage-bed created a stony race to be of one community with them"; in the second he backtracks briefly in order to explain how Pyrrha and Deukalion came to be on Parnassos in the first place and to emphasize for a second time Zeus's role

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[48]On the "two-term or abbreviated priamel" see Bundy 10 with n. 30, W. H. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius*, Mnemosyne Supplement 74 (Leiden 1982) 10.

[49]One scholium says that in applying the name Protogeneia to the daughter of Opous of Elis Pindar "changed the story" (ἐξήλλαχε δὲ τὴν ἱστορίαν 86c), and this is the view adopted by, e.g., Wilamowitz 359-60 and Bowra 287; two others attribute the identification not to Pindar alone but to "some" (κατὰ δὲ ἐνίους 64c, οἱ δὲ 79d), and scholars such as Bossler 204-205 and Mezger 473 posit the existence of an Opountian "Lokaltradition" (hitherto largely unexploited by poets) upon which Pindar drew. Elsewhere (e.g., *P.* 8.21-33, *N.* 8.19-22, *I.* 7.1-19) Pindar uses the παλαιός/νέος polarity to highlight the special appeal (and special dangers) of themes drawn from the *hic et nunc* (i.e., the victor's exploits) as opposed to the "prior glories" of myth and history (see A. M. Miller, "*Phthonos* and *Parphasis*: The Argument of *Nemean* 8.19-34," *GRBS* 23 [1983] 113-114), but the context in which these lines are firmly embedded tells against such an interpretation here, since the speaker remains deeply involved in παλαιά and has nothing to say about contemporary matters until his explicitly announced *laudes Opuntis* finally give way to *laudes Epharmosti*. To certain scholars (e.g., Fennell 100, Hubbard 122) the "newness" at issue pertains not to subject-matter at all but rather to style or mode of presentation.

[50]So, e.g., Wilamowitz 360, M. C. van der Kolf, *Quaeritur quomodo Pindarus fabulas tractaverit quidque in eis mutarit* (Rotterdam 1923) 103, Fehr 111, Nisetich 123, Lehnus 157, Bernardini 145.

in the fortunate outcome of events (Ζηνὸς τέχναις 52 ~ αἰολοβρέντα Διὸς αἴσᾳ 42).

λέγοντι μὰν
χθόνα μὲν κατακλύσαι μέλαιναν
ὕδατος σθένος, ἀλλά
Ζηνὸς τέχναις ἀνάπωτιν ἐξαίφνας
ἄντλον ἐλεῖν. κείνων δ' ἔσαν
χαλκάσπιδες ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι
ἀρχᾶθεν, Ἰαπετιονίδος φύτλας
κοῦροι κορᾶν καὶ φερτάτων Κρονιδᾶν,
ἐγχώριοι βασιλῆες αἰεί...
)—

They say indeed that mighty waters washed over the black earth, but by the devisings of Zeus an ebb-tide suddenly drained off the flood. From those ones were sprung of old your ancestors with their brazen shields, sons of daughters of Iapetos' race and the mightiest Kronids, a line of indigenous kings straight through....

The transition to the second panel is provided by lines 54ff, in which κείνων is a genitive of source referring back to Pyrrha and Deukalion (who have been brought back into the audience's mind by the vivid evocation of the Flood in the immediately preceding lines)[51] and in which αἰεί extends the period during which the line of their descendants ruled as "indigenous kings" forward in time to the moment when Zeus intervened decisively in Opountian history.[52] Being

[51] So, e.g., Σ 79c, Boeckh 190, Mezger 474, Christ 74, Gildersleeve 207, Fehr 110, Nisetich 126. Others (e.g., Fennell 100, Fraccaroli 318, Puech 427, Fernández-Galiano 261) refer κείνων to the λαοί of line 46 and construe the genitive with βασιλῆες at the end of line 56, but the lengthy suspension of syntax makes this improbable, particularly since when the audience first hears the word it cannot know that βασιλῆες will eventually be forthcoming.

[52] The sentence has given rise to copious discussion and a great variety of interpretations. The most plausible solution to the problems it presents seems to be that offered (with minor differences of detail) by Fraccaroli 318-319, Puech 425-426, and Bernardini 141-142, who understand Pindar to be assuming not one but *two* unions between Zeus and "daughters of Iapetos' stock," the first of which founded the "enchoric" dynasty that came to an end in Lokros and the second of which revived that failing line by the importation of new blood from Elis. In this light ἀρχᾶθεν in line 55 should perhaps be taken with what follows (as Turyn punctuates) rather than with what precedes: "sons of daughters of the stock of Iapetos and the mightiest Kronids *right from the beginning and all the way through*" (cf. Herod. 1.131.3, 3.80.3), i.e., before *and* after the line of ἐγχώριοι βασιλῆες failed. Both Pausanias (5.1.3-4) and Apollodorus (1.7.3, 5) report a tradition connecting the earliest kings of Elis with the "stock of Iapetos" through Aethlios, the son of Zeus by Protogeneia daughter of Deukalion. As for

addressed to the Opountians collectively, the second person plural possessive adjective ὑμέτεροι serves, like σφιν in line 47, to remind the audience that the speaker's focus in this whole section is (ostensibly, at least) on the city as a whole, not on Epharmostos as an individual.[53]

The centerpiece of the Opountian *oimos* is an account of the conception, birth, and kingship of the younger Opous. Although it is entirely reasonable that an overview of early Opountian history should give special attention to the hero whose name the city bears, we have seen that Pindar has another purpose here as well, one that bears not on the victor's city but on the victor himself: the presentation of Opous as a paradigmatic *probatio* of Epharmostos' praiseworthiness.

πρὶν Ὀλύμπιος ἀγεμών
θύγατρ' ἀπὸ γᾶς Ἐπει-
ῶν Ὀπόεντος ἀναρπάσαις, ἔκαλος
μίχθη Μαιναλίαισιν ἐν δειραῖς, καὶ ἔνεικεν
Λοκρῷ, μὴ καθέλοι νιν αἰὼν πότμον ἐφάψαις
ὀρφανὸν γενεᾶς. ἔχεν δὲ σπέρμα μέγιστον
ἄλοχος, εὐφράνθη τε ἰδὼν ἥρως θετὸν υἱόν,
μάτρωος δ' ἐκάλεσσέ νιν
ἰσώνυμον ἔμμεν,
ὑπέρφατον ἄνδρα μορφᾷ τε καί
ἔργοισι. πόλιν δ' ὤπασεν λαόν τε διαιτᾶν.

...until the Olympian lord, snatching up the daughter of Opous from the land of the Epeians, lay with her at ease among the ridges of Mainalos, and then carried her to Lokros, so that time, fastening doom upon him, might not bring him down while still bereft of offspring. His wife held

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Lokros, the scholia report that he 'fetched his ancestry from Zeus' (ἔσχε τὸ γένος ἐκ Διός 89), his father being either Zeus himself (82c, f) or Zeus's son Amphiktyon (96c).

[53]Σ 79c and 80 interpret the second person plural as referring to Epharmostos' family, a view that has been adopted by most later scholars, both in the nineteenth century (e.g., Boeckh 190, Dissen 115, Bossler 193, Mezger 475, Fennell 100, Gildersleeve 207) and recently (e.g., Pavese 107-108, Bernardini 141). However, this interpretation seems hard to reconcile with Pindar's total silence on the subject of the family elsewhere in the ode (as we noted earlier, neither Epharmostos' father nor his πάτρα is even named); contrast the use of the phrase ὑμετέρας ἀρετάς in *I.* 4.3, where the reference is clarified by the extended praise of the Kleonymidai that immediately follows. That the reference is to the Opountians generally is recognized by, e.g., Σ 82b (glossing κοῦροι as ὦ Ὀπούντιοι) and 82g, Schmid 248, Farnell 71, Illig 80, Slater s.v. So too at *O.* 13.14 (ὔμμιν δέ, παῖδες Ἀλάτα) the laudandus' fellow-citizens are (a) collectively addressed in the course of an explicitly announced *laus urbis* and (b) collectively characterized as the direct descendants of an early king (cf. the common application of the terms Ἐρεχθεΐδαι and Κεκροπίδαι to the Athenian populace at large).

> the mightiest seed within her, and the hero rejoiced when he saw his adopted son; he called him by the name of his mother's father, a man remarkable beyond telling for his beauty of form and for his deeds; and he gave him city and people to rule over.

It is noteworthy that although the narration of events prior to the hero's birth—Zeus's abduction of Protogeneia, their mating in Arcadia, her marriage to Lokros, her pregnancy—proceeds at a leisurely pace, the birth itself undergoes a kind of narrative elision: at one moment Protogeneia is still carrying the god's "greatest seed" within her body, and at the next Lokros is rejoicing in, and naming, the baby son with whom he has been unexpectedly presented. An even more startling elision immediately follows: the babe-in-arms whom Lokros has just "called to be the equal in name of his mother's father" (note again the unhurried fullness of expression) is within the space of a line-end pause "a man remarkable beyond telling for his beauty of form and his deeds," into whose stewardship Lokros proceeds to convey the city and its people. This instantaneous transition from earliest infancy to full maturity suggests an element of the miraculous in Opous' manly excellence, in the perfect balance he strikes between his outward appearance and his capacity for action. By highlighting the looks/deeds *topos* in this fashion, Pindar ensures that when, in the course of the ode's final triad, the audience is presented with a vivid picture of Epharmostos triumphant at Marathon, "in the bloom of youth and beautiful, and doing deeds of surpassing beauty," they will be prompted to recognize in him a contemporary instantiation of a heroic prototype indivisible from the city whose name he shares.

The transitional passage between the second and third panels in the triptych, like that between the first and the second, is both retrospective and prospective in force:

> ἀφίκοντο δέ οἱ ξένοι
> ἔκ τ' Ἄργεος ἔκ τε Θη-
> βᾶν, οἱ δ' Ἀρκάδες, οἱ δὲ καὶ Πισᾶται·
> υἱὸν δ' Ἄκτορος ἐξόχως τίμασεν ἐποίκων
> Αἰγίνας τε Μενοίτιον.

> Strangers came to him both from Argos and from Thebes, and others from Arcadia, and others from Pisa also; but among the settlers he chiefly honored the son of Aktor and Aigina, Menoitios.

On the one hand, the arrival of "strangers" from all over Greece–strangers who, once they have arrived, become "settlers" in Opountian territory–attests concretely to Opous' virtues as a man and king, thus confirming the brief but emphatic statement of his worth in the immediately preceding lines. On the other hand, although Opous still plays a grammatical and a narrative role in the lines (οἱ, τίμασεν), the shift of primary focus to the immigrants—and to the one named immigrant in particular (ἐξόχως)—effects a smooth transition to the lines on Patroklos that follow.

τοῦ παῖς ἅμ' Ἀτρείδαις
Τεύθραντος πεδίον μολὼν ἔστα σὺν Ἀχιλλεῖ
μόνος, ὅτ' ἀλκάεντας Δαναοὺς τρέψαις ἁλίαισιν
πρύμναις Τήλεφος ἔμβαλεν·
ὥστ' ἔμφρονι δεῖξαι
μαθεῖν Πατρόκλου βιατὰν νόον·
ἐξ οὗ Θέτιος †γόνος οὐλίῳ νιν ἐν Ἄρει
παραγορεῖτο μή ποτε
σφετέρας ἄτερθε ταξιοῦσθαι
δαμασιμβρότου αἰχμᾶς.

His son it was who, going with the Atreidai to the plain of Teuthras, alone stood his ground with Achilles at the time when Telephos routed the valiant Danaans and attacked their ships beside the sea. Thus was demonstrated for the appreciation of anyone who had understanding the warrior spirit of Patroklos; and thenceforward Thetis' son in deadly war exhorted him never to station himself apart from his own man-mastering spear.

Although Erasmus Schmid refers to this passage as a "digression" in his rhetorical schema of the ode,[54] it is of course not such even on the level of the fictive speaker, who *does* digress–fictively, at any rate–in his treatment of Herakles. As heir to a native tradition of excellence that is maintained without continuity of bloodline, being passed on from Lokros to his (adopted) son

[54]"Menoetii patris Patrocli, in quem digreditur" (237); Benedictus 176 also speaks of a "digressio." Approaching the passage from the perspective of a rhetorical formalism no less pervasive than (although of course quite different from) that of Schmid and Benedictus, Thummer 116-117 attempts to account for the presence of the "scheinbar abwegige Exkurs" by postulating an implausibly elaborate system of reflected credit: "Von Patroklos fällt Ruhmesglanz auf Menoitios, von Menoitios auf den König Opus, vom König auf die gleichnamige Stadt und von der Stadt auf ihren Bürger." Thus for Thummer, as for Schmid, the possibility of *direct* encomiastic relevance to Epharmostos seems to be precluded by the fact that in formal terms—i.e., on the level of the ode's unfolding train of thought—Patroklos is introduced as part of the *laudes urbis* rather than the *laudes victoris*.

Opous, from Opous to the "specially honored" newcomer Menoitios, and from Menoitios to his (biological) son, Patroklos not only forms an integral part of the speaker's encomiastic history of Opous—the third panel in a triptych, as we have expressed it—but provides it with a fitting climax, since in his person Opountian *areta* is carried out onto the stage of world events and there makes its mark beside the Panhellenic exemplar of *areta*, Achilles. On the level of the ode's underlying encomiastic argument, moreover, we have already noted that Patroklos forms, after Herakles and Opous, the last in a series of paradigmatic figures that Pindar has "excogitated" in support of his client's praiseworthiness from the relevant facts of identity and achievement; specifically, his courageous stand against Telephos serves as a model for—and thus sheds heroic luster on—the defensive valor (ἀλκά) triumphantly displayed by the youthful Epharmostos when he "endured a contest with his elders" at Marathon, as the audience will perceive when their attention is drawn to that exploit by the handling of the victory-catalogue in the final triad.

We also noted earlier, however, that although in terms of the picture that is conjured up (a lone figure battling against several apparently superior opponents), the Herakles-exemplum offers a more exact parallel to Epharmostos' exploit at Marathon than Patroklos does, the very aptness of the implied comparison between the hero and the youth potentially lays it open to charges of hyperbole and indecorum. In this light the subsequent replacement of the "alien" Herakles by the "native"—and lesser—figure of Patroklos has an implicitly corrective effect: potentially unbecoming overstatement is set aside in favor of a more modest (and therefore all the more credible) assessment of the degree to which Epharmostos approximates to heroic *areta*.[55] After all, if Patroklos' valor was such that he successfully held his ground against the mighty Telephos, he achieved that triumphant stand not alone but in the company (and hence presumably with the assistance) of Achilles; and if on the one hand his battle-station beside the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν is a mark of honor and a ratification of his martial prowess, it also inevitably points up certain limitations in that prowess when measured by the supreme standard. Between the superhuman exploit of Herakles son of Zeus and the remarkable but still merely mortal exploit of the youthful Epharmostos, Patroklos stands as a

[55]On the "replacement" of Herakles by Patroklos as a heroic prototype for Epharmostos, as well as the ethical implications of that replacement, cf. Simpson 120-122. Simpson also argues that the "rejected" tale of Herakles' victory over three gods formed part of Archilochos' καλλίνικος-hymn (cf. too L. Kurke, "The Poet's Pentathlon: Genre in Pindar's First Isthmian," *GRBS* 29 [1988] 97-113 [104-105]); but see Carey 153 n. 42.

mediating figure, part of the heroic world but linked to the laudandus by a shared historical and civic tradition.

But if on the level of the ode's underlying encomiastic argument the figure of Patroklos, like those of Herakles and Opous, is intended to function as paradigmatic "proof" of Epharmostos' praiseworthiness, the fact remains that none of the three is presented as such *by the speaker*. Indeed, beyond implicitly including Epharmostos (along with his fellow Opountians) in σφιν (47) and briefly addressing him (along with his fellows Opountians) in ὑμέτεροι (53), the speaker has said nothing that overtly pertains to the victor since he announced more than 60 lines earlier that he would be praising *both* the city of Opous *and* her "son" (αἰνήσαις ἔ καὶ υἱόν 14). The air of suspense thus created—when in fact will the laudator get around to dealing with the second half of his announced program?—is further heightened by carefully contrived traces of incipient digressiveness in the closing lines of the passage on Patroklos, where the speaker not only momentarily shifts his attention to Achilles, who unlike Patroklos *is* "alien" to Opountian concerns, but also momentarily focuses the audience's thoughts on bloodshed and destruction, themes inappropriate to a festal occasion, by conjuring up an image of Achilles' "man-taming spear."[56]

Added to the long delay in the appearance of an announced topic, these final hints of irrelevance and indecorum make the sudden shifting of gears signaled by the asyndeton in line 80 all the more plausible psychologically:

80 εἴην εὑρησιεπὴς ἀναγεῖσθαι
πρόσφορος ἐν Μοισᾶν δίφρῳ·
τόλμα δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλαφὴς δύναμις
ἔσποιτο.

May I be inventive of speech so as to proceed in fitting fashion in the Muses' chariot, and may boldness and comprehensive power attend me.

Apart from the retrospective implication in πρόσφορος ('suitable, appropriate'), which hints that the treatment of the preceding material was threatening to become *un*suitable, *in*appropriate when the speaker terminated

[56]On Pindar's technique of concluding narratives "with an emphatic reference to the fighter's weapon" see Race 47-49. Here δαμασιμβρότου αἰχμᾶς may be intended to hint at a catalogue of Achilles' victims such as is found at *O.* 2.81ff, *I.* 5.39ff, or *I.* 8.52ff.

it,[57] this prayer is directed forward to the daunting task that the speaker can put off no longer: the catalogue of Epharmostos' victories.[58] The verb ἀναγεῖσθαι seems to combine its primary sense of an exhaustive 'going through' of copious items with an implication of literal movement through space ('proceed, drive on') that is perfectly in keeping with the image of the Muses' chariot.[59] By having the speaker present the long-promised treatment of Opous' "son" as an undertaking that will tax his verbal ingenuity, his courage, and his stamina, Pindar not only draws deserved attention to the remarkable scale of his client's achievement even before it is demonstrated through a lengthy catalogue of particulars, but also highlights the key importance of that catalogue as the most concrete and incontrovertible, the "closest to the case at hand," of all the proofs of Epharmostos' praiseworthiness.

The criterion of "closeness" is one that Aristotle discusses at *Rhet.* 2.22.11-12:

> We must look not at what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα), marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject (ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος); for the more facts one has, the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable are they and less common (ὅσῳ δ' ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά). By common I mean, for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man, or one of the demigods, or because he went on the expedition against Troy; for this is applicable to many others as well (ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς), so that such is no more suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular I mean what belongs to Achilles but to no one else (ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν); for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks from

[57]For πρόσφορος as a term denoting poetic propriety cf. *N.* 3.31, *N.* 8.48, *N.* 9.7, and Simpson 119. Its essentially adverbial force in the present passage is noted by Fennell 102.

[58]The rhetorical function of lines 80ff relative to the following victory-catalogue is well expressed by Schmid 251 ("Praemittit huic alteri parti Confirmationis, Votum, quo εὑρησιέπειαν & verborum copiam ad enarrandas laudes Epharmosti sibi optat") and Benedictus 177 ("Nova praeparatione regreditur ad laudes Epharmosti. Ea autem constat εὐχῇ, qua petit ingenium & vires a Musis, ut dignis laudibus extollat Epharmostum") and has been recognized by most later commentators; see in particular R. Rauchenstein, "Zu Pindaros," *Philologus* 27 (1868) 334-335, Bundy 30, and Bernardini 148. Nonetheless, a number of scholars have followed the scholia (119a, 119e, 121d) and Boeckh 192 in positing a backward reference to Pindar's "inventiveness" on mythical themes (such as Patroklos); these include (in this century) A. Puech, *Pindare Olympiques* (Paris 1930) 120, W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928) 312, Farnell 72-73, and Fernández-Galiano 265.

[59]Cf. *N.* 10.19 and *I.* 6.56, and see L. Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy* (Ithaca and London 1991) 56-57.

> disembarking, being invulnerable; to have gone to the war when very young, and without having taken the oath; and all such things.

That Epharmostos is a Lokrian and an Opountian and lives up to his ethnic and civic traditions, that in certain respects he resembles such heroes of old as Herakles and Patroklos, even that he possesses remarkable athletic ability "by nature"—these are all circumstances and attributes which, actually or potentially, he shares with others (καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς), but the specific set of wrestling-victories that he has won (as a man in Argos, as a boy in Athens, as a youth matched against older opponents at Marathon, and so forth) belongs to him and to him alone (μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν). By reserving the bulk of Epharmostos' victories (all but the two most prestigious) for climactic presentation *en bloc* in the last triad of the ode—and by simultaneously dramatizing the long postponement through his careful scripting of the speaker's role—Pindar underscores their intended function as conclusive evidence that the athlete's current triumph at Olympia is the crowning manifestation of innate ability and that the parallels implicitly drawn between Epharmostos and his several heroic prototypes are fully justified.[60]

The catalogue itself gets under way with a brief commendation (presumably demanded by the terms of Pindar's contract) of one Lampromachos (presumably a relative of the laudandus) for his friendly treatment of strangers[61] and his prowess, the latter as specifically manifested in a triumph won at the Isthmus on a day when Epharmostos too was victorious, a coincidence that provides the bridge to the catalogue proper.

προξενίᾳ δ' ἀρετᾷ τ' ἦλθον
τιμάορος Ἰσθμίαισι Λαμπρομάχου
μίτραις, ὅτ' ἀμφότεροι κράτησαν
)--

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[60]Dissen 108 notes how Pindar has handled his praise of Epharmostos' "virtus gymnica" in such a way that "quod in principio mythice Herculis comparatione significatur...in fine directa oratione declaretur enumeratisque omnibus victoriis comprobetur Epharmostum esse luctatorem divinitus factum." Of course we can say that the victory-catalogue appears near the end of the ode because that is its "conventional" position according to generic norms, but by doing so we are simply restating the issue in different terms. It is likely that the convention arose in the first place because poets realized that the victory-catalogue would have its maximum effect only if a larger context were first established within which the *significance* of the particulars could emerge into view.

[61]On the meaning of προξενία here cf. E. L. Bundy, "The 'Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios'," *CSCA* 5 (1972) 81-82 n. 99, H. Lloyd-Jones, "Modern Interpretations of Pindar: The Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes," *JHS* 93 (1973) 135, C. O. Pavese, "La settima *Nemea* di Pindaro," *Studi in onore di A. Ardizzoni* (Rome 1978) 677.

μίαν ἔργον ἀν' ἀμέραν.
ἄλλαι δὲ δύ' ἐν Κορίν-
θου πύλαις ἐγένοντ' ἔπειτα χάρμαι,
ταὶ δὲ καὶ Νεμέας Ἐφαρμόστῳ κατὰ κόλπον·
Ἄργει τ' ἔσχεθε κῦδος ἀνδρῶν, παῖς δ' ἐν Ἀθάναις,
οἷον δ' ἐν Μαραθῶνι συλαθεὶς ἀγενείων
μένεν ἀγῶνα πρεσβυτέρων ἀμφ' ἀργυρίδεσσιν·
φῶτας δ' ὀξυρεπεῖ δόλῳ
ἀπτωτὶ δαμάσσαις
διήρχετο κύκλον ὅσσα βοᾷ,
ὡραῖος ἐὼν καὶ καλὸς κάλλιστά τε ῥέξαις.
τὰ δὲ Παρρασίῳ στρατῷ
θαυμαστὸς ἐὼν φάνη
Ζηνὸς ἀμφὶ πανάγυριν Λυκαίου,
καὶ ψυχρᾶν ὁπότ' εὐδιανὸν φάρμακον αὐρᾶν
Πελλάνᾳ φέρε· σύνδικος δ' αὐτῷ Ἰολάου
τύμβος ἐνναλία τ' Ἐλευσὶς ἀγλαΐαισιν.

Because of his friendly relations with foreigners and his prowess I have come to vindicate the honor of Lampromachos' Isthmian headbands, won when both of them gained mastery in action on a single day. Two other successes at the gates of Corinth befell thereafter, and others for Epharmostos in the valley of Nemea as well. At Argos he gained glory in the men's division, as a boy in Athens, and at Marathon, stripped from the ranks of the beardless, what a contest with his elders did he endure for the sake of silver cups, and when with quick-shifting cunning he had overcome the men without a fall and was passing through the circle of onlookers, what great shouts greeted him then, in the bloom of youth and beautiful, and having performed deeds of surpassing beauty! Then too, he was revealed as an object of wonder to the Parrhasian host at the festival of Zeus Lykaios, and so too when he carried off a cloak, warm antidote to frigid winds, at Pellene; and the tomb of Iolaos stands ready to bear witness to his splendors, and Eleusis by the sea.

Several important aspects of the catalogue have already been touched on, including its impressive size and the prominence given to the victory at Marathon both by its position relative to the other entries (which implies a distinct enhancement of the venue's ordinarily quite modest prestige) and by the unusual length and detail of its treatment. There are, however, at least two other features which also contribute to that prominence. One of these is the symmetrical placement of Marathon at the exact center of the list of venues (fifth out of nine); the other is the presence of an exclamatory adjective both at the very beginning of the entry (οἷον) and right before the epigrammatic formulation that brings it to a climax (ὅσσα), the effect of which is to highlight the emotive importance of the incident by recreating something of the

wonder which Epharmostos inspired in the circle of onlookers when he emerged "without a fall" from his struggle with *presbuteroi*. By all these means Pindar seeks to have the audience's attention focus and linger on those aspects of Epharmostos' athletic capacity and achievement which most clearly justify the implicit comparisons that he has proffered earlier in the ode—with Herakles battling three gods at Pylos, with Opous "remarkable beyond telling for his beauty of form and for deeds," with Patroklos standing his ground against Telephos' fierce assault. Moreover, the note struck by οἷον and ὅσσᾳ sounds forth again, even more overtly, in the lines on the Lykaia which immediately follow the Marathonian entry (τὰ δὲ Παρρασίῳ στρατῷ *θαυμαστὸς ἐὼν* φάνη), thus emphasizing that awe and admiration are precisely the response which *phua* made manifest in action is likely to evoke in those who witness it.[62]

Placed after such an astounding catalogue, the gnomic reflections on innate ability that constitute the last of the poet's *pisteis* appear to maximum effect, emerging "inductively" out of the facts at hand and giving explicit expression to conclusions that the audience has already been invited to draw on its own. If on occasion after occasion Epharmostos has 'gained mastery' in competition (cf. κράτησαν 84), the reason must be that he is athletically gifted "by nature," since whatever is natural 'wins hands down' (κράτιστον 100) in respect of quality.

τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν· πολλοὶ δὲ διδακταῖς
ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος
ὥρουσαν ἀρέσθαι·
ἄνευ δὲ θεοῦ, σεσιγαμένον
οὐ σκαιότερον χρῆμ' ἕκαστον· ἐντὶ γὰρ ἄλλαι
ὁδῶν ὁδοὶ περαίτεραι,
μία δ' οὐχ ἅπαντας ἅμμε θρέψει
μελέτα.

Everything that is by nature is best and strongest; many men rush to win themselves fame with talents that have been taught, but that which is without god is none the worse for being silently passed over in each and every instance. There are, after all, different avenues of achievement, some of which extend further than others; and no one object of preoccupation will offer encouragement to us all.

[62]Cf. *N.* 1.55ff (Amphitryon reacts to the sight of Herakles strangling the snakes), *N.* 3.50f (Artemis and Athena marvel at hunting exploits of the six-year-old Achilles), and *P.* 9.30f (Apollo calls upon Chiron to admire Kyrene's victorious combat with the lion).

In the chain of ratiocination to which the speaker's initial comment on the dominating superiority of τὸ φυᾷ gives rise, one thought inspiring another by way of contrast or explication, the relevance to Epharmostos' case, although never explicitly signaled, is always clear.[63] Epharmostos is *not* one of the "many" who owe what abilities they have to mere instruction rather than to "nature" (or to "god"): if he were, it is impossible that he could lay claim to such a series of successes as has just been enumerated. Epharmostos is *not* one of those whose strenuous pursuit of fame, doomed to abject failure from the outset, yields them in the end nothing but well-deserved silence. What he has achieved, he has achieved (like Herakles) κατὰ δαίμονα, not ἄνευ θεοῦ, and loud praise, not silence, is his reward.[64] Amid the diversity of human activities and human aptitudes—a diversity which helps to explain (γάρ 104) why success and failure turn upon the presence or absence of inborn qualities—Epharmostos stands out as a man who has made exceptional progress along the path laid out for him by nature and by god.[65]

Entirely and conspicuously absent from the gnomic series, however, is any association of inborn or god-given ability with the principle of heredity, the perpetuation of characteristics from generation to generation within a family line, such as can be seen in *P.* 8.35ff or *I.* 3.13f. In the former passage Aristomenes' success in "not disgracing" his maternal uncles Theognetos and Kleitomachos, both Panhellenic victors in wrestling, prompts the speaker to cite a mythical paradigm in illustration of the truth that "the noble spirit which passes from fathers to sons stands forth to view in accordance with nature" (φυᾷ τὸ γενναῖον ἐπιπρέπει / ἐκ πατέρων παισὶ λῆμα 44f); in the latter Melissos is complimented for "not disgracing the congenital excellence" of his Kleonymid ancestors (ἀνδρῶν δ' ἀρετάν / σύμφυτον οὐ κατελέγχει).[66] The

[63]Schmid 251 aptly characterizes this element in Pindar's praise of Epharmostos as an argument "a fortitudine, quam divinitus a naturae dotibus concessam, non affectatam, ἀντιθετικῶς contendit."

[64]Cf. Bernardini 151. On the general topic of litotes and "negative expressions" in Pindar see A. Köhnken, "Gebrauch und Funktion der Litotes bei Pindar," *Glotta* 54 (1976) 62-67 and Race 59-84.

[65]For this interpretation of lines 104-107 cf., e.g., Σ 158b and 158f, Boeckh 195, Mezger 477, Farnell 74. More complex readings are offered by R. Lattimore, "Pindar *Olympian* 9. 100-112," *CP* 41 (1946) 230-232 and Hubbard 122-124, each of whom argues against the view that the passage constitutes (in Hubbard's words) "a unilateral valorization of *phya*." Bundy 38 applies the lines entirely to the laudator, paraphrasing in this fashion: "There are many ways in which to praise by the rules of art, and no *one* of them will please everyone equally well."

[66]Cf. also the use of τὸ συγγενές (or πότμος συγγενής) to highlight the connection between the laudandus and victorious relatives in *P.* 10.11ff, *N.* 6.8f, and *N.* 5.40f.

absence of any such association in *O.* 9 is hardly surprising: to judge from the fact that, with the sole exception of Lampromachos' success at the Isthmus, the only victories mentioned in the ode are those of the laudandus himself—and Pindar's practice elsewhere lends credence to an argument *ex silentio* here—Epharmostos' was not an athletically prominent or gifted family.[67] Although Lampromachos' presence in the ode is most easily accounted for by the assumption that he was a relative of the victor,[68] Pindar's failure either to specify the exact nature of the relationship for the benefit of audiences beyond the immediate occasion or to hint in any way (as he does in other odes) at its general relevance to an understanding of the laudandus' own achievements seems to indicate that he does not regard the connection as one that contributes materially to his encomiastic argument.

In this light the curious pattern of genetic discontinuity which marks the Opountian *Geschlechtssage* would seem to acquire special significance. Quite apart from the "stony offspring" produced by Deukalion and Pyrrha ἄτερ εὐνᾶς, both of the paradigmatic figures singled out for special attention, Opous and Patroklos, are explicitly represented as *not* emerging out of the line of "indigenous kings" descended from Deukalion and Pyrrha, the former being adopted (cf. θετὸν υἱόν 62) into the royal line from outside by the childless Lokros and the latter being the son of a "resident alien" bound to the city's eponymous king not by blood but by "elective affinity" (υἱὸν δ' Ἄκτορος ἐξόχως τίμασεν ἐποίκων / Αἰγίνας τε Μενοίτιον 69f). Thus all three types of "proof" employed in the ode, factual, gnomic, and paradigmatic, combine to suggest that the tradition of Opountian *areta* of which Epharmostos is so obvious and so illustrious a manifestation is a civic and cultural phenomenon that need not depend upon the mechanisms of straightforward biological inheritance for its perpetuation: at intervals, through divine grace, great natural talents are born and then mold themselves in the image of the city's heroic exemplars. It would seem to be no accident that the sole reference to Epharmostos' parentage in the ode (αἰνήσαις ἐ καὶ υἱόν 14) represents him not as the son of any individual Opountian but as a son of the city herself.

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[67]Victorious relatives are mentioned in well over one-third of Pindar's epinicians: *O.* 2, 8, and 13, *P.* 7, 8, 10, and 11, *N.* 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10, *I.* 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8.

[68]So Σ 123a, 125c. Perhaps the boldest conjecture on his identity is that advanced by J. A. Nairn, "On Pindar's *Olympian Odes*," *CR* 15 (1901) 14: "It is not unnatural to assume that Lampromachus was first the παιδικὰ of Epharmostus, who subsequently adopted him as his son."

The distinction between natural ability and learning that lines 100-107 elaborate in reference to the laudandus provides a relevant background for a new movement of thought, this time primarily "subjective" rather than "objective" in application, which is signaled by the asyndeton in line 107 and which functions as the ode's "epilogue":[69]

σοφίαι μέν
αἰπειναί· τοῦτο δὲ προσφέρων ἄεθλον,
ὄρθιον ὤρυσαι θαρσέων,
τόνδ' ἀνέρα δαιμονίᾳ γεγάμεν
εὔχειρα, δεξιόγυιον, ὁρῶντ' ἀλκάν,
Αἶαν, τεόν τ' ἐν δαιτί, Ἰλιάδα,
νικῶν ἐπεστεφάνωσε βωμόν.

The ways of art are steep; but in offering *this* prize simply shout aloud, boldly proclaiming that by divine grace this man was born strong of hand, nimble of limb, with a look of courage in his gaze—and, Ajax, it is *your* altar, O son of Oileus, which in his victory he has crowned amid the feast.

As happens elsewhere in Pindar's odes, the speaker here rejects the laborious "ways of art" as out of place (or at least unnecessary) in the present circumstances;[70] by way of peroration to the present ode ("this prize")[71] all that is required to do Epharmostos justice is a simple vaunt, direct (ὄρθιον) and spi-

[69]I am not aware of any commentator who has even noted the existence of the asyndeton, let alone attempted to define its effect; nor have I come upon any text that punctuates the passage with a full-stop rather than a colon after μελέτα. While it is true that elements of language on both sides of the asyndeton (e.g., φυᾷ, ἄνευ θεοῦ, μελέτα, σοφίαι, ἄεθλον) allow for a secondary transference from athlete to poet or vice versa (on this point see in particular Bernardini 152 and Hubbard 123), it should also be noted that while the γάρ in line 104 firmly links everything from ἐντί through μελέτα to the preceding reflections on the laudandus' natural ability, the μέν in line 107 just as decisively orients σοφίαι...αἰπειναί toward the laudator's self-exhortation which immediately follows. Nonetheless, the break in thought remains far less emphatic than that found in, e.g., *O.* 2.83ff, *P.* 1.81ff, *N.* 4.69ff, or *I.* 5.46ff, where in each case the asyndeton initiates a full-fledged *Abbruchsformel.* In another respect, however, *I.* 5.46ff (on which see Race 53-54) does offer a parallel to *O.* 9.107ff, since in both cases antithetical particles (μὲν/ἀλλά, μὲν/δέ) are used to outline—or at any rate to hint at—one approach to the rhetorical task at hand and then to reject it in favor of another one that is more appropriate to the circumstances.

[70]Bundy 32 cites these lines among passages in which "the laudator, disdaining all device, makes his straightforward confidence and enthusiasm the measure of the laudandus' worth" and later offers this paraphrase: "the ways of art are difficult, but in this case just sing out" (64).

[71]On ἄεθλον = *hymnus praemium victoris* cf., e.g., Boeckh 195, Mezger 477, Gildersleeve 210, Slater, *Lexicon* s.v. a.

rited (θαρσέων), recapitulating the ode's central emphasis on the primacy of inborn god-given talent in his extraordinary career.[72] The phrase δαιμονίᾳ γεγάμεν is calculated to recall the gnome which brings the first triad to a close and motivates the introduction of Herakles, the first and grandest of Epharmostos' heroic prototypes (ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ σοφοὶ *κατὰ δαίμον' ἄνδρες / ἐγένοντ'* 28f.),[73] while the phrase ὁρῶντ' ἀλκάν highlights that ability to resist and eventually triumph over apparently overwhelming opposition which Epharmostos shares not only with Herakles but also with Patroklos, whose steadfast courage at Achilles' side rallied the ἀλκάεντες Δαναοί against Telephos. An abrupt apostrophe to Ajax son of Oileus, the local hero to whom Epharmostos' Olympic crown is dedicated (and at whose festival the ode itself is probably intended to be performed) is sufficient to bring the speaker's unfolding discourse to a plausible end by anchoring it in the *hic et nunc* of public celebration.[74]

The foregoing analysis of *O.* 9 has been conducted through a hypothetical reconstruction of the rhetorical process by which it was generated, beginning with the basic nucleus of factual information handed to the poet along with his commission. Although in doing so I have used the conceptual categories and the terminology developed by the rhetorical theorists of subsequent centuries, I believe that their usefulness outweighs—and hence justifies—whatever element of anachronism is involved. In offering the analysis my purpose has been twofold: to clarify both the relevance of the poem's various parts to Pindar's encomiastic purposes and the carefully plotted train of thought which unite them into a sequentially coherent whole, and more broadly, to suggest how the rhetorical model can shed light on questions posed by Pindar's selection and presentation of material in other epinicians—in particular, how maintaining an analytical distinction between *inventio* and *dispositio* as compositional phases

[72]Although Schmid 253 is mistaken (or so I believe) in attaching σοφίαι μὲν αἰπειναί to what precedes instead of what follows, he accurately defines the rhetorical function of lines 108-111 as that of an epilogue "in quo ἀνακεφαλαιωδῶς repetit argumentum laudis Epharmosti a donis naturae."

[73]The verbal echo between lines 110f and 28ff and its thematic significance have often been noted, e.g., by Boeckh 189, Bossler 209, Mezger 479, Wilamowitz 351.

[74]The older view, going back to the scholia, was that the last line of the ode represents the final item in Epharmostos' victory-catalogue (ὡς καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀποῦντι Αἰάντεια νενικηκότος 166a), but Boeckh 195 and most subsequent commentators agree in seeing a reference to the occasion of the ode's original performance. Cf. *N.* 2.24f, where, however, the apostrophe is directed toward those of the laudandus' fellow-citizens who are present at the occasion rather than to the hero who is presiding over it. On Ajax's minimal presence in the ode see above, p. 117.

can allow otherwise puzzling aspects of an ode's *Gedankengang* (e.g., the "impious" digression on Herakles in *O.* 9) to be recognized as artfully contrived solutions to tactical problems inherent in its constituent materials, "given" and "invented" alike.

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